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This report reviews military operations that employed a Joint Task Force (JTF) 
organizational model to organize subordinate forces. It provides background information; 
analyzes major characteristics to include mission, time line, participants and structures; 
and summarizes major lessons learned. A total of 845 source documents were identified 
for this review.  Sources include individual Joint Universal Lessons Learned Reports, 
After-Action-Reports, Joint-After-Action-Reports, informational papers, memoranda, 
letters, briefing presentations and information gathered through telephone and e-mail 
correspondence with selected personnel. 
 
Analysis indicates that a majority of operations commenced after January 1999 (86%), 
with a significant number of operations initiated after September 11, 2001 (58%).  A 
plurality of operations involved combat/counter-terror missions (39%); followed by 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and stability and security operations (21%); and 
non-combatant evacuation operations (7%).  Training and counter-drug operations, 
national security special events and other types of operations made up the remaining 
32%.  A flag or general officer most often commanded these operations, with most of 
these being led by an Army general officer.   
 
Analysis indicates that operations were lead by all combatant commands, but nearly 25% 
occurred in the Central Command Area of Responsibility.  The number of response days 
has continued to increase, with current operations accounting for 38% of response days 
accumulated in the previous decade (i.e., 1990-1999).  Examination of warning time 
characteristics for selected cases showed that a majority of operations had a planning 
period of 4-5 weeks. 
 
Content analysis of unique source documents identified a total of 922 problems/issues. 
Nearly a quarter of these problems/issues dealt with command, control, communication, 
computers and intelligence issues (C4I); 6% of the problems/issues dealt with 
deployment, engineering and logistics; 31% of the problems/issues dealt with personnel, 
training, financial management, legal, medical, and public affairs; and 39% of the 
problems/issues dealt with operations, plans and policy. These findings suggests that 
while progress has been made with respect to how we organize, train and equip to 
conduct a joint fight, there is still considerable room for improvement. 
 
Command and control of the JTF is a work in progress. JTF C4I capabilities remain a 
challenge.  Logistical support, including equipment, is lacking. Manpower and Training 
shortfalls impair the functioning of the JTF.  These findings lead us to propose that a JTF 
Functional Support Element (JTF-FSE) be developed to address challenges associated 
with these functional areas. 
 
A JTF Planning Smart Book should be developed to provide guidance and instruction on 
the JTF planning process to ensure the participation of key personnel. Attention is needed 
on the deployment planning and personnel rotation process.  Additionally, it is 
recommended that JTF guidance and policy be developed in several areas including 
 7 
disclosure of sensitive information; IA/Coalition access to intelligence and 
communications systems and data; INFOSEC and OPSEC for IA and Coalition partners.  
Finally, it is noted that JTF operations have unique funding requirements that demand 
flexibility.  Operations routinely include LNOs from all Services, Interagency and 
Coalition personnel.  A Joint Funding Process needs to be developed to enable the JTF to 
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1.1.  PURPOSE 
 
This report provides a review of recent military operations, which employed a Joint Task 
Force (JTF) organizational model.  The review was performed at the request of Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM) in order to identify the major characteristics of recent JTF 
operations and summarize major lessons learned.  The goal of the review was to 
document the rationale, establishment and operation of recent JTFs; conduct a literature 
review of JTFs from military and academic sources to provide lessons learned for future 
JTF development and operation; and develop a research protocol to be used in identifying 
and evaluating the decision processes, procedures and mechanisms through which JTF 
are formed.  The main body of the report presents the results of the review of operations 
to include the major characteristics of JTF operations and major lessons learned emerging 
from these operations.  Appendix A includes a review of the academic literature on 
teams, networks, cooperation and trust that examines the implications of this research for 
JTF operations.  Appendix B includes a JTF protocol designed to further examine 
problems and concerns identified in the review.  A separate classified report contains 
individual information on each of the JTF operations reviewed. 
 
 
1.2.  BACKGROUND 
 
The end of the “Cold War” brought great hopes for a new era of peace and stability for 
the world.  It promised to provide an unprecedented “New World Order” that would be 
characterized by harmonious relationships between the superpowers of the world.  It also 
brought hopes for spreading peace and prosperity to less fortunate nations in the Third 
World.  Coupled with these hopes, were expectations that the need for military 
intervention throughout the world would slowly diminish.  However, none of these hopes 
and dreams has been realized.  In fact, the Post-Cold War period ushered a significant 
increase in regional conflicts throughout the worlds less fortunate nations.
1
  U.S. forces 
deployed to new missions in such places as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans 
and more recently to Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
                                                 
1
 Cobble, E.W., Gaffney, H.H., & Gorenburg, D.  (2003, August).  For the record: All U.S. forces’ 
responses to situations, 1970-2000 (with addition covering 2000-2003) (Center for Naval Analyses Report 
CIM D0008414.A2/Final).  Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis.  Grimmett, R.F. (2002, February).  
Instances of use of United States Armed Forces abroad 1798-2001 (Congressional Research Service Report 
for Congress RL 30172).  Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service. 
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The U.S. Armed Forces have performed well in accomplishing their missions in domestic 
and international fronts.  However, there continue to be mounting concerns regarding the 
most effective way to organize, train and equip military forces for the next century.
2
  
Although reforms introduced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 have made a 
significant impact in the Service’s ability to engage in “joint” operations, evidence 
suggests that more changes are needed to optimize the effectiveness of the force.
3
   
                                                 
2
 Bruner, E. (2004, May).  Military forces: What is the appropriate size for the U.S.?  Congressional 
Research Service (RS21754).  Washington, D.C.  Congressional Research Service.  Gaffney, H.H. (2003, 
April).  The American way of war in the emerging strategic environment: Remarks presented at the Army 
War College’s annual strategy conference (Center for Naval Analyses Report CIM D0008205.A1/Final).  
Alexandria, VA.  Center for Strategic Studies.  Gaffney, H.H., Cobble, W.E., Gorenburg, D., & McDevitt, 
M. (2004, February).  The American way of war and its transformation in the Post-Cold-War period, 1989-
2003 (Center for Naval Analysis Report CRM D0008607.A1/Final). Alexandria, VA.  Center for Strategic 
Studies.  Government Accounting Office. (1996).  Military readiness: Data and trends for January 1990 to 
March 1995 (GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR).  Washington, DC.  Author.  Ryan, M.C. (1998).  Military 
readiness, operations tempo (OPTEMPO), and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. forces doing too 
much? (Congressional Research Service Report 98-41).  Washington, DC.  Congressional Research 
Service. 
3
 Hammond, P.Y. (1990).  Fulfilling the promise of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in operational planning and 
command.  In J.A. Blackwell Jr., & B.M. Blechman (Eds.), Making defense reform work (pp. 121-150).  
Mc Lean, VA.  Brassey Incorporated.  Murdock, C.A., Flournoy, M.A., Williams, C.A., Campbell, K.M., 
Coss, M.A., Marks, A.N., & Weitz, R.W. (2004, March).  Beyond Godldwater-Nichols (BG-N): Defense 
reform for a new strategic era (Phase I Report).  Washington, DC.  Center for Strategic and International 
Studies.  Center for Strategic and International Studies.  (2005, March).  Beyond Godldwater-Nichols (BG-
N): Defense reform for a new strategic era (Phase 2 Report).  Washington, DC.  Author.  Quinn, D.J. 
(1999).  The Goldwater-Nichols DoD reorganization act: A ten year retrospective.  Washington, DC.  
National Defense University. 
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There is a need to re-examine the organization and structure of joint forces to address 
emerging roles that the military is likely to play in the foreseeable future.  Research 
suggests that significant concerns remain on the question of how to prepare, organize and 
equip Joint Task Forces (JTFs).
4
  Studies have shown that there are recurrent problems 
associated with the “ad hoc” nature of JTF Headquarters—namely problems with 




                                                 
4
 Bartch, E.D. (1997).  Standing joint task force headquarters: A step in the right direction?  Unpublished 
manuscript, US Marine Corps Command and General Staff College at Quantico, VA.  Betros, L.A. (1991).  
Coping with uncertainty: The joint task force and multi-service military operations.  Unpublished paper, 
US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  Boy, W.W. (1992).  Joint 
task force bravo: A model for forward presence.  Unpublished manuscript, US Army War College at 
Carlisle Barracks, PA.  CHIPS (2003, Summer).  Talking with brigadier general Marc E. Rogers.  CHIPS, 
15-18.  Davis, P.K.  (1982, March).  Observations on the rapid deployment joint task force: Origins, 
directions and mission.  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in 
Cincinnati, OH.  Goodman, M.T., & Scott, R.M. (1998, September).  Standing joint task force: Opportunity 
lost.  Marine Corps Gazette, 82(9), 38-39.  Grant, N.P. (1993).  Joint task force staffs: Seeking a mark on 
the wall. Unpublished paper, US Naval War College at Newport, R.I.  Gritton, E.C., Davis, P.K., Steeb, R., 
& Matsumura, J. (2000).  Ground forces for a rapidly employable joint task force: First-week capabilities 
for short-warning conflicts.  Santa Monica, CA. RAND.  Herman, R., & Welch, L. (1997).  Defense 
science board task force on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) integration final report.  Washington, DC.  Defense Science Board Task Force.  
Hildenbrand, M.R. (1992).  Standing joint task forces: A way to enhance America’s warfighting 
capabilities?  Unpublished paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas.  Hoffman, J.T.  (1997).  Organizing command echelons for joint warfare.  Unpublished paper, U.S. 
Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA.  King, R.H.  (1995). NATO’s combined joint 
task force: Separable but not separate.  Unpublished paper, U.S. Naval War College at Newport, R.I.  
McMillin, P.M. (1992).  The standing joint task force afloat. Unpublished paper, U.S. Navy Command and 
General Staff College.  Saunders, W.A. (1992).  Joint pub 5-00.2 joint task force planning guidance and 
procedures: A critical review.  Unpublished paper, U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA.  
Walsh, E.M. (1992).  Does a MAGTAF commander have sufficient capability within the MAGTAF 
command element to command a JTF?  Unpublished manuscript, US Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College at Quantico, VA.   Zimmerman, D.K. (2004, July-August).  Understanding the standing joint force 
headquarters.  Military Review, 28-32. 
5
 Coleman, J.C. (1991).  Tumbling “component walls” in contingency operations:  A trumpet’s blare for 
standing joint task force headquarters.  Unpublished paper, US Army Command and General Staff College 
at Fort Leavenworth, KA.  Colodney, L.L. (1995).  Operational command and control for joint and 
component commands: Integration or duplication.  Unpublished manuscript, US Army Command and 
General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KA.  Henchen, M.L. (1993).  Establishment of a permanent 
joint task force headquarters: An analysis of soucing and command and control structure capable of 
executing forced entry contingency operations.  Unpublished Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KA.  Napper, J. (2002).  Information management in the JTF.  
Unpublished paper, US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA.  Ross, B.A. (1993).  The joint task 
force headquarters in contingency operations.  Unpublished paper, US Army Command and General Staff 
College at Fort Leavenworth, KA.  Stewart, G., Fabbri, S.M., & Siegel, A.B. (1994).  JTF operations since 
1983 (Center for Naval Analysis Report CRM 94-42/July 1994).  Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval 
Analysis. 
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Table 1.1.  Summary Review of Past JTF Operations. 
Author/Year Operation (JTF) Major Problem Areas 
Coleman (1991) Mayaguez 
Urgent Fury 
 
Command & Control 
Intelligence 
Communications 
Personnel & Training 
Plans & Policy (Joint Planning) 
 
Colodny (1995) Urgent Fury Command & Control 
Intelligence & Communications 
 





Command & Control 
Communications 
Personnel & Training 
 
Hoffman (1997) Uphold Democracy 
Restore Hope 
Desert Shield/Storm 
Command & Control 
Communications 
Personnel & Training (Jointness) 
 




Personnel & Training 
 
Ross (1993) Urgent Fury 
El Dorado Canyon 
Just Cause  






Operation & Plans 
 























Command & Control  
Interagency Coordination 
Coalition Partner Coordination 
Logistic Support/Coordination 
Plans & Policy for IA/Coalition 






Table 1.1 presents a summary of studies reviewing major military operations conducted 
within the past three decades.  As can be seen from Table 1.1, there is a consistent pattern 
of failures in resolving issues related to four broad areas including (I) Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence; (II) Logistics; (III) Personnel and Training; and (IV) 
Plans and Policy.  These problems are pervasive and impact all types of operations 
including combat (e.g., Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Shield/Storm), civil support (e.g., 
Hurricane Andrew, JTF Los Angeles, JTF Yellowstone) and peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations (e.g., Provide Comfort, Restore Hope) to name but a few.  
Furthermore, these failures have been felt across time despite policy changes that have 
taken place during the same time period (e.g., Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986).  The 
consistency of these findings across this time period suggests that there is a need to 
continually monitor our progress and check the status of our efforts to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the JTF process. 
 
 
1.3. TASKS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
This report reviews military operations conducted from 1990 to 2004 that employed a 
Joint Task Force (JTF) organizational model to organize subordinate forces.
6
  It focuses 
on major JTF operations and excludes data from subordinate JTFs formed as part of 
larger JTF organizations.  The review analyzes data from the “Joint Universal Lessons 
Learned” (JULLS) database and includes individual JULLS reports, “After-Action 
Reviews” (AARs) and “Joint After-Action Reviews” (JAARs) for major military 
operations conducted during this time period.  The review provides background 
information on each of the JTF operations; analyzes major characteristics of each JTF 
operation including its mission, time line, participants and structures; and summarizes 
major lessons learned for these JTF operations.  Detailed reports for each JTF operation 
are included in a separate classified report.
7
  Summary findings are presented and 
discussed in this report. 
 
 
1.4. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT 
 
This report is organized into four Chapters.  Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the 
report, highlighting major tasks and objectives.  Chapter 2 provides a description of the 
methodology including data, procedures and analytical strategy. Chapter 3 presents the 
major findings from the review of operations. It discusses the implications of these 
findings for future JTF operations.  Chapter 4 presents the major conclusions and 
recommendations of the study. 
 
                                                 
6
 Combatant commanders can generally adopt six organizational models for subordinate forces: (1) 
subordinate unified command, (2) joint task force. (3) functional component command, (4) Service 
component command, (5) single Service force command, or (6) combatant commander control of specific 
forces (Joint Publication 3-0). 
7
 Estrada, A.X., & Laurence, J.H.  (2005, February). Joint task force operations (JTF) 1990-2004.  























2.1. IDENTIFICATION OF JTF OPERATIONS 
 
A current listing of Joint Task Force operations was compiled from multiple sources 
including the Joint Staff—Personnel (JS-J1), Operations (JS-J3), Strategic Plans & Policy 
(JS-J5), Operational Plans & Interoperability (JS-J7); and each of the Combatant 
Commands (COCOM)—US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); US Southern 
Command (USSOUTHCOM); US Pacific Command (USPACOM); US Central 
Command (USCENTCOM); US European Command (USEUCOM).  Data obtained from 
the Joint Staff and COCOMs were cross-referenced by searching COCOM and JTF 
related websites.  Table 2.1 presents JTF operations identified for this review. 
 
 
Table 2.1. Joint Task Force Operations 1990-2004 
Operation Organization Dates 
Skilled Anvil JTF-SA Jul99-Jun00 
Atlas Response JTF-AR 6-30Mar00 
Honduras JTF B Aug83-Dec04* 
 JTF 6 Nov89-Dec04* 
Northern Watch CTF-ONW Jan97-May03 
Southern Watch JTF-SWA Aug92-May03 
Allied Force JTF-NA Jan-Jul99 
Joint Guardian TF-Falcon Jun99-Dec04* 
Allied Harbor JTF-SH Apr-Jun 99 
Summit Guard/NCS JTF CS Oct99-Dec04* 
Enduring Freedom-Philippines JTF 510 Jan02-Dec04* 
 JTF Piton Jan-Feb01 
Winter Olympics JTF O Jan01-May02 
 JTF 509 Dec01-NA 
Enduring Freedom JTF 160 Jan-Nov02 
Enduring Freedom JTF170 Feb-Nov02 
Enduring Freedom JTF GTMO Nov02-Dec04* 
Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan CJTF 180/76 May02-Dec-04* 
Autumn Return JTF-AR Sep02-Oct02 
 JTF 519 Oct02-Dec04* 
 JTF-4 Jan-Apr03 
Enduring Freedom-HOA CJTF HOA Dec02-Dec04* 
Sheltering Sky JTF-L Jul-Oct03 
 JTF 58 16-24-Oct03 
Secure Tomorrow JTF-H Mar-Jun02 
Iraqi Freedom CJTF 7 Jun03-May04 
Iraqi Freedom CJTF7/MNC-I May04-Dec04* 
Iraqi Freedom CJTF7/MNF-I May04-Dec04* 
Note: (*) indicates continuing operation as of December 2004. 
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2.2. DATA AND PROCEDURES 
 
A total of 845 source documents were identified for this review.  Source documents 
included individual Joint Universal Lessons Learned Reports (JULLS), After-Action-
Reports (AARs), Joint-After-Action-Reports (JAARs), informational papers, memoranda, 
letters, briefing presentations and information gathered through telephone and e-mail 
correspondence with COCOM and JTF personnel. 
 
Table 2.2 presents summary characteristics of the JTF documents by source type.  As can 
be seen in Table 2.2, source documents included JULL Reports (87%), AAR/JAAR (4%), 
and other types of documents (13%).
8
  We contacted personnel from the Joint Center for 
Lessons Learned (JCLL) to cross-reference and validate our search strategy, and to locate 
additional sources of information.  JCLL personnel validated our strategy and indicated 
that all available information (e.g., JULLs, AARs/JAARs) would be accessible via 
COCOM or JCLL websites.
 9
  No additional data were identified nor retrieved. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Source Documents by Category for JTF Operations 1999-2004. 
  Type of Document 
JTF Total JULLS AAR/JAAR OTHER 
JTF-SA 30 26* 2 2 
JTF-AR 64 60* 3 1 
JTF B 8   8 
JTF 6 3   3 
CTF-ONW 6 1  5 
JTF-SWA 62 59  3 
JTF-NA/TF Falcon 9  2 7 
JTF-SH 3   3 
JTF CS 47 40  7 
JTF 510 19   19 
JTF Piton 0    
JTF O 47 45* 2  
JTF 509 0    
JTF 160/JTF170/JTF GTMO 242 235 3 4 
CJTF 180/76 17  13 4 
JTF-Autumn Return 2   2 
JTF 519 0    
JTF-4 0    
CJTF HOA 7   7 
JTF-L 129 126 3  
JTF 58 112 110 1 1 
JTF-H 33  1 32 
CJTF7/MNC-I/MNF-I 5   5 
     
TOTAL 845 702 30 113 
Note: (*) indicates JULLS were derived from AAR/JAAR. 
  
                                                 
8
 Other sources documents included memoranda, briefings, informational papers and information gathered 
through direct correspondence with COCOM/JTF personnel 
9
 Personal communication with M. Barker, Research Analyst with the Joint Center for Lessons Learned. 
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Data for this study were obtained from multiple sources.  Individual requests for data 
were submitted to the Joint Staff (JS-J1, JS-J3, JS-History Office), COCOM Historians 
and Lessons Learned Specialists, and individual JTF Public Affairs Officers.  Each 
request asked for general information about the JTF including mission, dates, 
commander, organizational structure, administrative processes (JMD; manning type; fill 
rates), planning process (conplan, exercises, staff assistance) and C4 systems (hardware, 
software, netware).  The requests also asked for documents and reports describing major 
issues and problem areas associated with each operation.  In addition, computerized 
searches of the Joint Universal Lesson Learned (JULL) databases for each COCOM (i.e., 
NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM) were performed to cross reference 
sources and identify additional source documents for each JTF. 
 
 
2.3. ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
 
All source documents were assessed for both quality and content.  Documents containing 
(a) irrelevant information; or (b) duplicate/redundant information were identified and 
removed from further analysis.
10
  Content analytical techniques were used to analyze all 
source documents.  Content analysis is an analytical technique applied to qualitative 
data.
11
  It allows researchers to reduce textual data into content categories based on an 
explicit set of coding of procedures.  A conceptual analytical approach was employed for 
the present study.  Conceptual analysis focuses on identifying and quantifying major 
concepts within a text.  Initially, members of the research team reviewed a subset of 
documents.  This review identified major categories across operations and suggested an 
emergent coding strategy.
12
  Four conceptual categories were identified through this 
process.  Category I included documents dealing with Command, Control, 
Communication, Computers and Intelligence issues.  Category II included documents 
dealing with Deployment, Engineering, Logistics, Mobilization and R & D Acquisitions.  
Category III included documents dealing with Personnel, Training, Financial 
Management, Information Management, Legal, Medical, Public Affairs and Foreign 
Affairs issues.  Category IV included documents dealing with Operations and Plans & 
Policy.  Categories were used to code data and tabulate frequency of items within each 
category. 
  
                                                 
10
 14 documents containing irrelevant or duplicate information were not subjected to analysis. 
11
 Carley, K. (1990).  Content analysis. In R.E. Asher (Ed.), The encyclopedia of language and linguistics. 
Edinburgh.  Pergamon Press.  Government Accounting Office.  (1996).  Content analysis: A methodology 
for structuring and analyzing written material (GAO/PEMD-10.3.1). Washington, DC.  Author.  
Krippendorf, K. (1980). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology.  Beverly Hills, CA. Sage 
Publications.  Roberts, C.W. (Ed.) (1997).  Text analysis for the social sciences: Methods for drawing 
statistical inferences from texts and transcripts. Manwah, NJ. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  Weber, R.P. 
(1990).  Basic content analysis (2
nd
 Edition).  Beverly Hills, CA.  Sage Publications. 
12
 Emergent coding is a process by which salient themes and categories are derived through initial review 
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CHAPTER 3 




Data analysis proceeded in two steps.  Initially, all source documents were coded for 
descriptive analysis.  Each document was coded for several features including (a) 
operation; (b) duration; (c) geographic location; (d) service; (e) CJTF rank; (f) mission 
type; and (e) warning time.  Next, content analytical methods were employed to derive 
estimates of the type and frequency of problem/issues encountered across operations.  
The results are presented in the sections below.  Characteristics of JTF operations are 
presented in the first section.  Warning time of JTF operations are presented in the second 
section.  Major lessons learned are presented in the last section. 
 
 
3.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF JTF OPERATIONS 
 
Characteristics of JTF operations were compiled to provide an overview of the nature and 
scope of operations conducted during this time period.  Figure 3.1 presents a time line for 
each operation included in this review.  As noted in Figure 3.1, the majority of JTF 
operations were initiated after 1 January of 1999.  Four exceptions to this trend include 
JTF Bravo, JTF 6, CTF ONW and JTF SWA, which commenced prior to this date.  JTF 
Bravo and JTF 6 are Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (SJTFHQ) that do not have 
supporting forces assigned to the JTF; CTF ONW and JTF SWA were follow-on 
missions from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 
 
Figure 3.1 reveals that a significant number of operations were conducted after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  In fact, 53% of the operations were started after 
that date.  Although not all JTFs are necessarily associated with the on-going Global War 
on Terror (GWOT), the shift in the number of operations within this short time frame, 
suggests that the so-called “peace dividend” of the 1990s gave way to a period of 
increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). 
 
Indeed, the nature of the threats we face, and the enemies we must confront, have 
changed dramatically, leading to a transformation of the security environment in which 
operations must now unfold.
13
  These changes are reflected in the types of operations US 
forces have engaged in during this period.  Figure 3.2 shows that the plurality of 
operations involved combat/counter-terror missions (39%), followed by peacekeeping 
(PKO), humanitarian assistance (HAST) and stability and security operations (SASO) 
(21%); and non combatant evacuation operations (NEO) (7%).  Training and counter-
drug operations, national security special events and other types of operations made up 
the remaining 32%. 
  
                                                 
13
 Joint Chiefs of Staff (2004).  National military strategy of the United States of America 2004: A strategy 
for today—a vision for tomorrow.  Washington, DC.  Author. 
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JTF-SA          
JTF-AR          
JTF B          
JTF 6          
CTF-ONW          
JTF-SWA          
JTF-NA          
TF-Falcon          
JTF-SH          
JTF CS          
JTF 510          
JTF Piton          
JTF O          
JTF 509          
JTF 160          
JTF170          
JTF GTMO          
CJTF 180/76          
JTF-AR          
JTF 519          
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Figure 3.2 JTF Operations by Mission Type 
 
These findings are consistent with the results of a recent study of military operations 
conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA).
14
  CNA found that the majority of 
operational missions involved contingency positioning or show of force (51%).
15
   CNA 
also found a growing increase in the percentage of combat operations (14%) and 
comparable figures for both PKOs (24%) and NEOs (7%).  Thus, there appears to be a 
continuing increase in combat missions and a relatively stable number of PKOs and 
NEOs. 
 
Table 3.1 presents other characteristics for each JTF operation included in this review.  
Examination of the data in Table 3.1 leads to four overarching generalities.  First, JTFs 
have operated in all geographic combatant commands.  Second, JTFs have been led by all 
military departments including Reserve and National Guard components.  Third, JTFs 
have been commanded most often by a general/flag officer.
16
  Fourth, JTF response days 
have continued to increase across decades. 
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 Cobble, E.W., Gaffney, H.H., & Gorenburg, D.  (2003, August).  For the record: All U.S. forces’ 
responses to situations, 1970-2000 (with addition covering 2000-2003) (Center for Naval Analyses Report 
CIM D0008414.A2/Final).  Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis. 
15
 Operations reviewed did not necessarily employ a JTF organizational model. 
16
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Table 3.1.  Major Characteristics of JTF Operations 1990-2004 
JTF Dates COCOM Service Rank Mission Duration 
JTF-SA Jul99-Jun00 EUCOM USA O10 Plan SASO for FRY 330 
JTF-AR 6-30Mar00 EUCOM USAF O8 HAST 25 
JTF Bravo Aug83-Dec04* SOUTHCOM USA O6 Training/HAST/Counterdrug 7665 
JTF 6 Nov89-Dec04* NORTHCOM USA O7 Training/Counterdrug 5505 
CTF-ONW Jan97-May03 EUCOM USAF O7 Combat: No Fly Zone 1211 
JTF-SWA Aug92-May03 CENTCOM USAF O8 Combat: No Fly Zone 3920 
JTF-NA Jan-Jul99 EUCOM USN O10 Support NATO PKO FRY 170 
TF-Falcon Jun99-Dec04* EUCOM USA O7 PKO Kosovo 2005 
JTF-SH Apr-Jun 99 EUCOM USA O10 HAST to FRY 82 
JTF CS Oct99-Dec04* NORTHCOM USARNG O8 NSSE: CBRNE 1885* 
JTF 510 Jan02-Dec04* PACOM SOCPAC O7 Combat/Counterrorism 699* 
JTF Piton Jan-Feb01 SOUTHCOM NA NA NA 60 
JTF Olympic Jan01-May02 JFCOM USARNG O7 NSSE: Winter Olympic 515 
JTF 509 Dec01-NA PACOM NA NA NA 1460 
JTF 160 Jan-Nov02 SOUTHCOM USA O7 Detention  398 
JTF170 Feb-Nov02 SOUTHCOM USA O8 Interrogation 258 
JTF GTMO Nov02-Dec04* SOUTHCOM USA O7 Detention/Interrogation 787* 
CJTF 180/76 May02-Dec-04* CENTCOM USA O8 Combat/Counterrorism 940 
JTF-AR Sep02-Oct02 EUCOM SOCEUR O7 NEO 14 
JTF 519 Oct02-Dec04* PACOM NA NA NA 790* 
JTF-4 Jan-Apr03 CENTCOM NA NA NA 120 
CJTF HOA Dec02-Dec04* CENTCOM USMC O8 Combat: Counterrorism 753* 
JTF-L Jul-Oct03 EUCOM USA O8 NEO 74 
JTF 58 16-24-Oct03 PACOM USN O10 NSSE: Security for POTUS 8 
JTF-H Mar-Jun02 SOUTHCOM USMC O7 SASO 107 
CJTF 7 Jun03-May04 CENTCOM USA O9 Combat/SASO 335 
MNC-I May04-Dec04* CENTCOM USA O9 Combat/SASO 210 
MNF-I May04-Dec04* CENTCOM USA O10 Combat/SASO 210 
Note: (*) indicates continuing operation as of December 2004. NA: Not Available.  SASO: Security and Stability 
Operation.  FRY: Former Republic of Yugoslavia.  HAST: Humanitarian Assistance Operation.  NATO: North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. PKO: Peacekeeping Operation.  CBRNE: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Event. 
NSSE: National Security Special Event.  NEO: Non Combatant Evacuation Operation. 
 
 
Further examination of each of these characteristics reveals some interesting patterns.  
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of JTF operations by COCOM.  As can be seen in 
Figure 3.3, 11% of the operations were conducted by NORTHCOM, 21% of the 
operations were conducted by SOUTHCOM, 14% of the operations were conducted by 
PACOM, 29% of the operations have been conducted by EUCOM, and 25% of the 
operations were conducted by CENTCOM.  Although the distribution of JTF operations 
indicates that all COCOMs have shared the burden of responsibility in leading 
operations, it is important to recognize that 25% of these operations occurred within the 
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).  This is particularly important to consider 
because the lack of permanent bases and tenuous agreements with countries in the region 







Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of JTF operations by Service.  As can be seen in Figure 
3.4, 54% of the operations were commanded by the Army, 11% of the operations were 
commanded by the Air Force, 7% of the operations were commanded by the Navy, 7% of 
the operations were commanded by the Marine Corps, and 21% of the operations were 






























Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of JTF operations by level of command.
17
  As shown in 
Figure 3.5, the majority of the operations were commanded by a General/Flag officer—
JTF Bravo is the only operation commanded by an O6 level officer (presently a Colonel).  
Thirty-seven percent of the operations were commanded by a Brigadier General/Rear 
Admiral (Lower Half), 24% of the operations were commanded by a Major General/Rear 
Admiral (Upper Half), 10% of the operations were commanded by a Lieutenant 





Figure 3.6 JTF Operations Command Level by Year 
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 This analysis excludes 4 operations for which data on command level was not available (i.e., JTF Piton; 
JTF 509; JTF 519; JTF 4). 




























Further examination of these data across time reveals an increase in the rank 
requirements for JTF command.  As can be seen in Figure 3.6, the number of JTF 
commanded by O7 and O8 has increased steadily throughout the years; JTFs commanded 
by 09 and 010 has also grown.  Whereas the increase of JTFs commanded at the 07/08 
level can be understood in terms of increased OPTEMPO, the increase in JTFs 
commanded at 09/10 may reflect the increasing VUCA associated with these operations. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the number of response days for each JTF operation included in this 
study.  Response days were defined as the number of days between the start and end of 
actual operations—i.e., when JTF forces were conducting the mission.  It should be noted 
that these estimates do not take into account the time associated with the planning process 
(i.e., warning time).  As can be seen in Table 3.1, response days ranged from 8 days (for 
JTF 58) to 7,665 (for JTF Bravo).  Figure 3.7 shows the cumulative number of response 
days for military operations within the past four decades.  As can be seen in Figure 3.7 
the number of response days has grown continually across decades.  The total number of 
response days for military operations conducted during the 1970s (i.e., 1970-1979) was 
10,245 days.  The total number of response days for military operations conducted during 
the 1980s (i.e., 1980-1989) was 17,382 days—which represents approximately a 70% 
increase over response days in the 1970s.  The total number of response days for military 
operations conducted during the 1990s (i.e., 1990-1999) was 66,930 days—which 
represents a 285% increase over response days in 1980s.  The total number of response 
days for military operations conducted during the 2000s (i.e., 2000-2004) is 25,622—
which represents 38% of the number of response days in 1990s.  It is important to recall 
that the number of response days accumulated for the 2000s represent a period of only 5 




Figure 3.7 JTF Response Days by Decade18 
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 Data for military operations from 1970-1990 was taken from Cobble, E.W., Gaffney, H.H., & 
Gorenburg, D.  (2003, August).  For the record: All U.S. forces’ responses to situations, 1970-2000 (with 
addition covering 2000-2003) (Center for Naval Analyses Report CIM D0008414.A2/Final).  Alexandria, 















1 JAN 2000—31 DEC 2004 
 32 
In summary, the analysis of major characteristics of JTF operations reveals a number of 
significant trends.  First, we note that the majority of operations commenced after 
January 1999, with a significant number of operations initiated after September 11 2001.  
Second, we note that a plurality of the operations reviewed involved combat missions or 
peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance missions.  Third, we note that a substantial 
proportion of these operations have involved EUCOM, CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM 
but nearly 25% have taken place in the CENTCOM AOR or are associated with 
operations related to GWOT (e.g., OEF, OIF).  Fourth, we note that JTF operations are 
most often commanded by a flag or general officer, with most of these being led by an 
Army general officer.  Finally, we note continuing growth in the number of response days 
for JTF operations—with current operations accounting for 38% of response days 
accumulated in the 1990s. 
 
 
3.3. WARNING TIME CHARACTERISTICS FOR SELECTED CASES 
 
Warning time characteristics of JTF operations were compiled to examine the JTF 
planning process.  Warning time was defined as the amount of time between the first 
order relating to an operation (e.g., Warning Order [WARNORD]; Planning Order 
[PLANORD]; Alert Order [ALERTORD]) and the execution order for that operation 
(e.g., EXORD).
19
  We attempted to collect data on each operation but were only able to 
obtain complete data for 16 of the operations reviewed.  Thus, the results of these 
analyses are based on the 16 cases for which complete data was available.  We 
acknowledge the limitation of these findings and emphasize that these must be interpreted 
with caution. 
 
Table 3.2 lists warning time for the 16 cases available for analysis.  As can be seen from 
Table 3.2 warning time ranged from 0 to 476 days.  The operations include the full 
spectrum of missions, i.e., combat, PKO/HAST/SASO, NEO, and NSSEs.  The 
distribution of operations included in this analysis was 50% combat, 25% 
PKO/HAST/SASO, 12% NEOs and 12% NSSEs.  While these data may not be 
comprehensive, they appear to approximate the population of operations from which they 
were drawn (See Figure 3.2). 
 
  
                                                 
19
 Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability.  (1999, January 13).  Joint task force guidance and 
procedures (Joint Pub 5-00.2). Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Gaffney, H.H. (2002, June).  
Warning time for US forces’ response to situations: A selected study (Center for Naval Analyses Report 
CIM D0006378.A1/Final).  Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval Analysis.  Guerra, S. J. (1997, November).  
Responses to Harm's-Way and Humanitarian Situation by Naval Forces, 1990-1996  (Center for Naval 
Analyses, CRM 97-100).  Alexandria, VA. Center for Naval Analysis. 
 
 33 
Table 3.2 Warning Time for Selected JTF Operations 
JTF Mission Warning Time* 
CTF-ONW Combat 0 
JTF-AR HAST 0 
JTF-H SASO 6 
JTF-SWA Combat 8 
JTF 160 Combat 12 
JTF-AR NEO 15 
CJTF HOA Combat 26 
CJTF 180/76 Combat 30 
JTF 58 NSSE 30 
JTF-L NEO 35 
JTF 170 Combat 35 
JTF-NA PKO 52 
JTF GTMO Combat 75 
JTF 510 Combat 120 
TF-Falcon PKO 120 
JTF O NSSE 476 
Note. (*) Indicates the number of days between the first order relating to an operation and the execution 
order for that operation (i.e., WARNORD to EXORD). 
 
 
To further examine these data, we coded warning time into weekly intervals ranging from 
0 (indicating no warning time) to greater than six weeks.  Figure 3.8 shows the 
distribution of warning time by the number of weeks.  As can be seen in Figure 3.8, the 
majority of the operations had a warning time of less than 6 weeks.  Twelve percent of 
the operations had no warning period, 12% of the operations had a warning period of 
about 1 week, 19% of the operations had a warning period of about 2-3 weeks, 25% of 
the operations had a warning period of about 4-5 weeks, and 31% of the operations had a 
warning period longer than 6 weeks.  Thus, we find that with few exceptions (e.g., JTF 
NA, JTF GTMO, JTF 510, TF Falcon, JTF O) the majority of JTF operations have a 






















3.4. MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Content analytical methods were used to analyze the 845 unique source documents 
obtained for analysis.  Each source document was reviewed and coded into one of the 
four categories that were identified in the emergent coding process.  Category I included 
documents dealing with Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence 
issues.  Category II included documents dealing with Deployment, Engineering, 
Logistics, Mobilization and R & D Acquisitions.  Category III included documents 
dealing with Personnel, Training, Financial Management, Information Management, 
Legal, Medical, Public Affairs and Foreign Affairs issues.  Category IV included 
documents dealing with Operations and Plans & Policy.  Frequency of problems/issues 
contained within each source document was recorded and tabulated.  Additionally, salient 
themes within each category were also identified.  Context units within each theme were 




Figure 3.9 Distributions of Problems/Issues by Category 
 
 
A total of 922 problems/issues were contained within the 845 source documents 
reviewed.  Figure 3.9 shows the distribution problems/issues by category type.  As can be 
seen in Figure 3.9, 24% of the problems/issues identified were related to Category I, 
which dealt with command, control, communication, computers and intelligence issues 
(C4I); 6% of the problems/issues identified were related to Category II, which dealt with 
deployment, engineering and logistics; 31% of the problems/issues identified were 
related to Category III, which dealt with personnel, training, financial management, legal, 
medical, and public affairs; and 39% of the problems/issues identified were related to 
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 This section provides an overview of major lessons learned across the JTFs reviewed.  For detailed 



















Table 3.3 Salient Themes and Sample Issues by Category 
 Salient Themes Sample Issues 
   
Category I Command & Control  Unclear roles and responsibilities—
OPCON/ADCON/TACON 
 Lack of support from DJTFAC and LNO 
 Bifurcation of chain of command—CJTF 
dual hatting impaired focus on JTF 
 Lack of guidance on JTF HQ formation led 
to ad hoc establishment of HQ—SJTFHQ 
 
 C4 Capabilities  Inadequate specification of JTF C4 needs 
 Lack of secure voice/data comm. 
 Shortfalls in Hardware, Software, 
Netware—GCCS, SINCGARS, SATCOM, 
SIPRNET, CENTRIX, Crypto, bandwidth, 
LAN access 
 
 J2 Capabilities  Equipment/accessibility issues—
Network/LAN access, SATCOM for J2 
 Lack coordination/integration of J2 product 
 SOP for J2 data sharing with IA/Coalition 
 Ad hoc ISR support to functional areas 
 Lack of secure voice/data capabilities—
MACC, JWICS, LAN Support 
 Interoperability of J2 equipment 
 
Category II Logistic Plans & Equipment  Unclear delineation of J4-C2 
 Lack of planning/coordination of J4 needs 
 Inadequate specification of equipment and 
personnel needs to support J4 mission 
 Lack of ITV of logistic materiel 
 
 Deployment Planning  Delayed deployment of 
personnel/equipment 
 Coordination of country clearance/over-
flights 
 Reserve mobilization process is inefficient 
 Lack of support for reserve dependents—
family support, housing and allowance 
issues. 
 
 JTF Funding  Lack of joint funding capability to support 
JTF costs up front 
 Lack of joint funding capability to support 
JTF support to IA/Host Nation/Partner 
Nation/Coalition Partners 
 
Note. Category I—Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence.  Category II— Deployment, 
Engineering, Logistics, Mobilization and R & D Acquisitions.  Category III— Personnel, Training, 
Financial Management, Information Management, Legal, Medical, Public Affairs and Foreign Affairs.  




Table 3.3 Continued 
 Salient Themes Sample Issues 
   
Category III Manpower Shortfalls  Inadequate specification of personnel 
requirements on JMD 
 Significant shortfalls in functional areas—
J1, J2, J4, J6, Engineering, PAO, Medical, 
SJA, Component/IA/Coalition LNOs 
 
 Training Shortfalls  JMD/JOPE/TPFDD 
 J2/J6 systems requirements 
 Funding for Joint/IA/Coalition 
 OPSEC/INFOSEC for IA/Coalition 
 Culture/Religion impact on mission 
 Psychological health of forces 
 
 Rotation Planning  Uncoordinated rotation process leads to 
significant personnel shortfalls 
 Rotation process leads to inadequate 
turnover process 
 Rotation process results in loss of 
institutional memory for JTF SOPs and 
emergent processes 
 
Category IV Planning Process  Maintain updated rosters for POCs  
 Integrate key personnel in planning process 
 Ineffective and inefficient mission analysis 
 Integration of IA/LNO/Coalition personnel 
 Establish IA planning task force for 
regional planning 
 
 Policy/Guidance  Guidance on INFOSEC/OPSEC for 
missions with IA/Coalition personnel 
 Guidance on Disclosure of Classified 
Information to IA/HN-PN/Coalition 
 Guidance on IA/Coalition access to J2/J6 
systems and data. 
 Guidance on ROE Development 
 SOP for SJTFHQ Requirements 
 JTTP for CSAR/PR 
 JTTP for PAO/JIB/IOM 
 JTTP for Medical Operations 
 JTTP for J2 Dissemination to IA/Coalition 
 
   
Note. Category I—Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence.  Category II— Deployment, 
Engineering, Logistics, Mobilization and R & D Acquisitions.  Category III— Personnel, Training, 
Financial Management, Information Management, Legal, Medical, Public Affairs and Foreign Affairs.  
Category IV—Operations and Plans & Policy. 
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Table 3.3 provides a summary of the main findings across JTF operations reviewed.  
Table 3.3 also lists salient themes and sample issues for each of the emergent categories 
identified.  As shown in Table 3.3, three themes dealing with command and control (C2), 
C4 capabilities, and J2 capabilities were identified for Category I; three themes dealing 
with logistic plans and equipment, deployment planning, and funding were identified for 
Category II; three themes dealing with manpower shortfalls, training shortfalls and 
rotation planning were identified for Category III; two themes dealing with planning 
processes and policy/guidance were identified for Category IV. 
 
These findings highlight several recurrent challenges that are associated with 
employment of the JTF organizational model.  First, the results suggest that the 
organization of JTF C2 remains a challenge.  Indeed, C2 organizational issues were 
mentioned across all of the operations reviewed.  Although the nature of the challenges 
may vary across these operations, the simple fact remains that we have yet to develop a 
successful approach for supporting the JTF build up process.  This is particularly 
important given the fact that supporting personnel are available at some of the COCOMs 
to address these issues (e.g., DJTFACs are available at SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and 
EUCOM).  Another related challenge involves C4 and J2 capabilities.  C4 and J2 
capability shortfalls in hardware, software and netware were pervasive across the 
operations included in this review.  Although alternative solutions are usually developed 
to meet mission requirements, C4/J2 capabilities that are flexible, deployable and 
interoperable are needed.  These capabilities should be configured to have the necessary 
hardware, software and netware to support C4/J2 mission requirements and ensure rapid 
and reliable dissemination of intelligence and communications.  These capabilities should 
also be configured to provide adequate workspace for all personnel. 
 
Second, the results suggest that logistics, deployment and funding of JTF operations are 
also challenging.  This trilogy is particularly important to consider since the vast majority 
of JTF operations have been conducted (and will likely continue to be conducted) in 
AORs that lack well established systems and relationships to support deployment of 
personnel and logistical support for JTF operations.  Recall that 25% of the JTF 
operations reviewed were taking place in CENTCOM AOR, which lacks bases and firm 
agreements with neighboring nations.  Failure to address logistics and deployment issues 
may result in substantial increases in operational costs and time delays in the delivery of 
equipment and supplies.  Neither of these outcomes is desirable or sustainable in volatile, 
uncertain, complex and ambiguous security environment in which forces must operate.  
Another related issue involves JTF funding.  There is need to develop funding procedures 
that provide JTF costs up front.  Furthermore, funding procedures need to be flexible 
enough to support Joint/Service costs, and interagency/coalition costs. 
 
Third, the results suggest that there are continuing challenges associated with manning 
and training of JTFs.  Personnel shortfalls were pervasive in the operations reviewed.  
One plausible explanation for this finding may involve the Joint Manning Document 
(JMD) planning process.  Personnel shortfalls may be caused by the inadequate 
specification of personnel requirements on the JMD.  It is important to ensure that the 
JMD reflect JTF personnel requirements including specification of training requirements.  
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Failure to properly specify personnel requirements may be associated with the increased 
need for training observed in this review.  Training shortfalls were noted for J2/J6 
systems, funding and JMD/JOPES/TPFDD.  Lack of properly trained personnel within 
any of these areas is likely to have an impact on JTF operations.  It is important to ensure 
that personnel and training requirements are properly identified on the JMD to ensure that 
JTFs are adequately manned with qualified personnel (i.e., properly trained in functional 
areas).  Training on the impact of culture and religion on military operations, 
psychological health of forces and funding Joint/IA/Coalition partners was also needed.  
Training incorporating aspects of culture/religion on JTF operations is critical given the 
increased number of operations being carried out in Muslim nations.  Additionally, 
greater understanding of the cultural and religious factors that can potentially impact 
operations is essential in today’s security environment.  Relatedly, greater understanding 
of the psychological variables that may influence personnel performance are also 
important to consider.  Finally, the rotation planning process appears to present a 
significant challenge in the operations reviewed.  Rotation planning is particularly 
important because it can have a negative impact on JTF operations.  Rotation planning 
should ensure that it provides adequate lead-time to conduct turnover between incoming 
and outgoing personnel and ensure preservation of institutional processes that emerge as 
a function of time and experience. 
 
Fourth, the results also highlight challenges associated with the planning process and the 
growing need for policy and guidance on various aspects of JTF operations.  Integration 
of key personnel at all phases of the crisis action planning (CAP) process is critical for 
the proper conduct of mission analysis.  Up-to-date rosters for point of contact can 
facilitate this process.  Relatedly, CAP process can benefit from the integration of 
IA/LNO/Coalition personnel.  With regard to policy and guidance, the results highlight 
the need for policy and guidance on information security (INFOSEC) and operational 
security (OPSEC) when dealing with IA and Coalition personnel.  There is also a need 
for guidance and policy on disclosure of sensitive information to IA/Coalition personnel.  
Guidance is also needed to address accessibility to J2/J6 systems and data by 
IA/Coalition personnel.  Lastly, the need for Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures 
(JTTP) for several areas was noted including combat search and rescue 
(CSAR)/personnel recovery (PR); Public Affairs (PAO)/Joint Information Bureau 






Review of unique source documents of major JTF operations conducted between 1990-
2004 reveals several interesting findings.  The majority of operations were initiated near 
the start of the new decade, with the large percentage of these commencing after 
September 11, 2001.  Combat and peacekeeping/humanitarian make up the largest 
portion of these operations (60%).  Operations have been conducted in all AORs and 
have been led by all COCOMs.  However, 25% of these have been conducted in the 
CENTCOM AOR.  The majority of operations have been lead by a general/flag officer, 
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most likely from the Army.  Review of dates and warning times for selected cases 
suggests that operations are lasting longer but the majority of these are planned in less 
than 5 weeks (69%).  Examination of lessons learned suggests that there are recurrent 
challenges associated with JTF operations.  Challenges impact four broad areas of JTF 
operations including C4ISR; Logistics, Deployment and Funding; Manpower, Training 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
4.1.  OVERVIEW 
 
Since the passage of the Goldwater—Nichols Act of 1986, the Department of Defense 
has continually strived to increase its capacity to engage in joint operations.  Indeed, a 
number of significant changes have been implemented to improve the way in which we 
organize, train and equip forces for joint operations.  However, examination of 
problems/issues of concern reveal a pattern of continuing challenges across several areas 
including C4ISR; Logistics, Deployment and Funding; Manpower, Training and Rotation 
Planning; and Plans and Policy.  These findings are consistent with those reported in 
previous studies of JTF operations (See Table 1.1).  The consistencies of these findings 
are quite remarkable considering the fact that the situational characteristics of these 
operations vary significantly in terms of missions, scope, geographic location and degree 
of jointness.  These findings suggests that although progress has been made with respect 
to how we organize, train and equip to conduct a joint fight, there is still considerable 
room for improvement. These results have a number of important implications for how 
we organize, train and equip in future JTF operations. 
 
 
4.2.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.2.1.  Command, control, communications and intelligence 
 
Conclusion 1.  Command and control of the JTF is a work in progress.  Delineation of 
command and control was problematic across many of the operations reviewed.  C2 
structures need to clearly specify roles and responsibilities for all personnel within the 
JTF HQ and between supporting forces.  For example, bifurcation of the chain of 
command (i.e., dual-hatting of the CJTF) dilutes attention and focus on the JTF process.  
This is particularly important during the initial planning process when the attention of the 
CJTF is critical and time is significantly compressed.  Although there may be situations 
in which dual hatting may provide some benefits (e.g. operations involving the 
integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces within CONUS, i.e., NORTHCOM AOR), it 
should be avoided as a general rule.  CJTF should rely on subordinate personnel to fulfill 
alternative roles whenever possible.  Lack of support from the Deployable Joint Task 
Force Augmentation Cells (DJTFAC) also hampered JTF C2.  Support from DJTFAC 
should be available to ensure that C2 architecture is properly designed.  Whenever 
necessary the DJTFAC should fill the position until properly trained personnel are 
integrated into the JTF via the augmentation process.  Finally, it is important to ensure 
that adequate facilities and workspaces are available to support C2 mission requirements.  
To ensure that C2 structures are properly identified, including the specification of roles 
and responsibilities and facility and space requirements, we recommend that a standing 
C2 support element be developed to facilitate the stand up of JTF C2.  The C2 support 
 42 
element should be familiar with C2 requirements and be able to fill JTF C2 positions 
until properly trained personnel are augmented. 
 
 
Conclusion 2.  JTF C4ISR capabilities remain a challenge.  C4ISR capabilities 
shortfalls were pervasive in the JTF operations reviewed.  C4ISR shortfalls involved 
hardware, software and netware (e.g., GCCS, SINCGARS, SATCOM, SIPRNET, 
CENTRIX) for both JTF-J2 (Intelligence) and JTF-J6 (Communications).  Accessibility 
issues also impacted C4ISR.  Access to C4ISR assets was not always available to JTF or 
to supporting forces (e.g., IA personnel, Coalition personnel).  In addition, lack of 
guidance (e.g., SOPs) for standardizing J2 intelligence products further complicated 
C4ISR challenges for the JTF.  Adding to the scope of these problems was the fact that 
interoperability of equipment was not always achieved and ISR support was ad hoc.  It is 
important to ensure that JTF C4ISR capabilities meet mission requirements.  
Accordingly, it is recommend that a C4ISR support element be created to provide 
technical advice to the JTF J6/JTF J2 during the initial stages of the JTF planning 
process.  The support element should facilitate the identification and specification of 
C4ISR needs and augment JTF J2/J6 until properly trained personnel are augmented. 
 
 
4.2.2.  Logistics, deployment and funding 
 
Conclusion 3.  Logistical support, including equipment, is lacking.  Command and 
control of the JTF J4 is hampered by shortfalls in both personnel and equipment.  
Equipment shortfalls are particularly problematic as they often lead to second and third 
order effects.  Limited C4 capabilities impair ITV of supplies and equipment, which in 
turn may lead to sub-optimal logistic arrangements (e.g., increased reliance on 
commercial [vs. military] logistical support systems), which in turn may result in 
increasing operational costs and increased delays in delivery of equipment and supplies.  
Logistical support is critical for the successful execution of JTF operations.  We need to 
ensure that JTF J4 has the proper personnel and equipment to fulfill mission 
requirements.  Shortfalls in personnel and equipment may be caused by inadequate 
specification of J4 requirements and inadequate planning.  Accordingly, it is 
recommended that a JTF J4 support element be created to provide technical advice to 
the JTF J4 during the initial stages of the JTF planning process.  A Joint Logistics and 
Transportation Planning Task Force could be set up to survey logistic requirements and 
catalogue equipment and personnel requirements for doctrinal purposes.  In addition, it is 
recommended that JTF J4 be integrated early into the planning process to ensure that 




Conclusion 4.  Deployment planning process needs to improve.  Deployment of JTF 
forces will always be a challenge.  The nature, scope and pace of JTF operations (i.e., 
short warning time and nearly instantaneous employment into VUCA environments) 
guarantees that the process will remain dynamic and ever changing.  However, the 
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underlying planning process required to deploy forces should be stable across operations.  
The results of this review suggest that there is a need to improve the deployment planning 
process.  Although joint doctrine does provide some general guidance on particular 
aspects of the deployment process
21
 there is a need to address challenges associated with 
the deployment and employment of Reserve Component (RC) personnel.  Knowledge 
and familiarity with the joint deployment process is critical for JTF operations.  
Accordingly, it is recommended that both guidance and a supporting deployment 
element be created to improve deployment planning of JTF forces.  In particular, 
specific guidance on the establishment of Joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement 




Conclusion 5.  JTF operations have unique funding requirements that demand 
flexibility.  There is an increasing need for flexibility in the funding process for JTF 
operations.  Operations are increasingly involving greater number of participants from 
diverse organizations.  Operations now routinely include LNOs from all Services, 
Interagency and Coalition personnel.  This change in participation demands greater 
flexibility in the JTF’s ability to provide funding support to these participants.  There is a 
need to establish a funding capability that is able to support JTF costs up front and covers 
costs associated with support for Joint, IA and Coalition personnel.  Accordingly, it is 
recommended that a Joint Funding Process be developed to enable JTF to provide 
funding for Joint/IA/Coalition support. 
 
 
4.2.3.  Personnel, training and rotation planning 
 
Conclusion 6.  Manpower and Training shortfalls impair the functioning of the JTF.  
The review of operations suggests that manning and training pose a significant challenge 
to JTF operations.  Personnel shortfalls were reported in all JTF operations included in 
this review.  This may be caused by the inadequate specification of manpower and 
training requirements on JTF JMDs.  Indeed, problems associated with personnel 
shortfalls are often compounded by the augmentation of personnel who lack proper 
training for key functions within the JTF.  It is important to ensure that JTFs are manned 
with qualified personnel (i.e., formally trained in specific functional area).  Accordingly, 
it is recommended that a support element be created for the JTF J1.  This element 
should comprise individuals knowledgeable with the JTF manning process to include 
knowledge of JMD and JOPES processing.  Individuals must also be knowledgeable of 
manning requirements for all functional and specialty areas within the JTF (e.g., J-
directorates and special staff—PAO, SJA, CMOC, Medical, Engineering) to include 
requirements for LNOs (e.g., interagency and coalition).  In addition, training shortfalls 
observed suggest the need to institute specific training in particular areas affecting JTF 
operations.  It is recommended that training packages be developed for Joint-
Interagency-Coalition intelligence and communications requirements and limitations.  
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procedures (Joint Pub 5-00.2). Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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Furthermore, it is recommended that a survey of intelligence and communications 
architectures and systems be conducted to catalogue Service, Interagency and 
Coalition capabilitities, identify strengths and weaknesses, and identify interoperability 
challenges and solutions.  Training doctrine is also needed to address the impact of 
cultural and religious factors on mission planning and execution.  JTF operations are 
almost always conducted in foreign environments with vastly different cultural and 
religious systems.  Cultural and religious factors should contribute to the planning 
process and influence the execution the mission.  Accordingly, it is recommended that 
training doctrine on cultural and religious influence on JTF operations be developed.  
Doctrine should provide information on political, economic social, technological and 
informational aspects of the culture.  Doctrine should also include information on major 
religious influences within the culture including historical information on the status of 
organized religious groups. 
 
 
Conclusion 8.  Personnel rotation planning needs to improve.  The review of operations 
suggests that the rotation planning process is often asynchronous with the manpower 
requirements of the JTF.  In many cases, the rotation planning process resulted in 
positions being unfilled for key functional areas within the JTF.  Lack of a coordinated 
rotation plan limited transition and turnover processing between out-going and in-coming 
personnel.  This process also resulted in significant losses of institutional memory for 
informal processes and procedures developed as a function of time and experience.  It is 
important to ensure that the rotation of personnel provides adequate time for turnover and 
transition of outgoing and incoming personnel.  The rotation process needs to provide 
sufficient time to ensure that institutional memory for SOPs are exchanged between 
personnel.  The rotation process also needs to be synchronized with the manpower needs 
of the JTF.  The rotation process needs to ensure timely and efficient filling of personnel 
throughout the JTF. 
 
 
Conclusion 9.  JTF planning process lacks participation of key personnel.  The review 
of JTF operations suggests that the JTF planning process does not always include 
relevant personnel.  Inclusion of personnel from key functional areas, LNOs, IA, and 
Coalition partners did not always occur.  Moreover, lack of updated rosters for key 
personnel often make it impossible to request assistance from key personnel whenever a 
particular issue arises.  It is important to ensure that JTF planning integrate participation 
from all functional areas to include LNOs and coalition personnel.  JTF rosters should be 
developed for key functional areas and should be periodically reviewed and updated to 
ensure accuracy of the information.  It is recommended that a JTF Planning Smart 
Book be developed to provide guidance and instruction on the JTF planning process.  
The smart book should include information on key directorates, roles and responsibilities, 
and identify commonly asked questions and answers related to the planning process.  The 





Conclusion 10.  JTF guidance and policy is needed in key functions.  The reviews of 
operations suggest the need for guidance and policy in several areas pertaining to the 
successful execution of JTF operations.  Guidance is needed for disclosure of sensitive 
information to IA and Coalition partners; IA/Coalition access to intelligence and 
communications systems and data; INFOSEC and OPSEC for IA and Coalition partners.  
There is also a need for formal doctrine covering specialty areas within the JTF.  JTTP 
should be developed for several areas including CSAR/PR; JIB/IO; and Medical 
Operations.  Additionally, JTTPs should incorporate IA and coalition roles. 
 
 
4.2.4.  Summary 
 
Review of major military operations conducted between 1990-2004 indicates that there 
are continuing challenges with the planning and execution of JTF operations.  Challenges 
impact four broad areas including C4ISR; Logistics, Deployment and Funding; 
Manpower, Training and Rotation; Plans and Policies.  Section 4.1 presented a series of 
recommendations designed to address challenges associated with each of these functional 
areas—namely personnel (e.g., C2), intelligence (e.g., C4ISR), logistics and 
communications.  Figure 4.1 links conclusions and recommendations by JTF functional 
areas.  As can be seen from Figure 4.1, our analysis leads us to propose that a JTF 
Functional Support Element (JTF-FSE) be develop to address challenges identified in this 
review.  Figure 4.1 depicts the organizational configuration of this element.  It is 
important to note that this model is not comprehensive.  Our intent is to provide a 
descriptive model of the critical support areas emerging from our review.  We 
acknowledge that this model may not capture all of the relevant problems/issues 




4.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
 
 
The findings presented in this report are limited by the particulars of the data we were 
able to obtain.  We were not able to obtain primary source materials for each operation 
(e.g., JULLS/JAAR).  In some case we had to rely on secondary sources (e.g., 
memoranda of record and summary reports).  In cases where no documented information 
was available, we relied on individual interviews with personnel involved/knowledgeable 
with these operations.  To the extent possible we collected data from at least two sources 
(e.g., documents, interviews).  These limitations notwithstanding, it is important to place 
our findings into the larger body of work reported in previous studies of military 
operations.  Viewed from this perspective we find that the results of the present study are 
remarkably consistent with those reported in the literature.  The consistency of findings 
across studies provides some assurance against some of these concerns. 
 
Though the results of this study add to our understanding of the challenges associated 
with the planning and execution of JTF operations, there are several issues that could not 
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be addressed with these data.  We recommend that a survey of JTF commanders be 
conducted to assess their perceptions regarding the importance of each of the problem 
areas identified in this review (e.g., command and control; logistics) and examine the 
nature of the problems including workarounds and solutions.  We recommend that a 
comprehensive study of warning time be performed on military operations to include JTF 
operations from 1990 to the present.  This study would allow validation of the analysis 
presented in the present study.  Though we do not expect to find significant differences 
across studies, we would expect that the estimates for planning time to be more accurate.  
We recommend that a survey of current JTF communications and intelligence sections be 
conducted to catalogue hardware, software and netware systems and configurations for 
use in future JTF operations.  The results of this study could be used to develop a “JTF 
SMART BOOK” on communications and intelligence.  We recommend that a 
comprehensive effort to catalogue and maintain a historical database of JTF operations be 
conducted.  The results of these efforts could enable further examination of JTF 
operations by independent researchers and academics interested in studying military 
operations.  Finally, we recommend that a biannual review of JTF operations be 
conducted to periodically examine progress and identify continual challenges related to 

















Figure 4.1.  JTF Functional Support Element Model 
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TEAMS, NETWORKS, COOPERATION, AND TRUST 
 
Janice H. Laurence, Ph.D. 
 
 
 Cohesion is a central concept in military training and operations.  Group training 
and experiences are meant to engender team solidarity, which has been shown to promote 
military effectiveness.  In addition to the importance of teams to military readiness, the 
edict to “train as we fight” has implications for the organization and maintenance of Joint 
Task Forces (JTF).  To meet today’s missions and in response to directives, the Services 
must operate “jointly.”  Although there are few if any research studies that directly 
address JTF structure and management, the literatures regarding teams, organizational 





A team is an interdependent group, organized toward a common goal, with 
specific roles. A “team” approach is appropriate when there is a need for expertise in 
various areas and the concurrent performance of two or more tasks is required.  Teams 
operate in the context of a larger task and its members have relevant specialized 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes.  Team structure is division of responsibilities or work 
requirements into subtasks.  Task conditions typically include high workload and time 
pressure. Research involving aviation crews, naval surface warfare teams, and tank crews 
has found that effective team performance is not an automatic result of training 
individuals (Salas, Bowers, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995).    Teams must synchronize 
“taskwork,” the specific behaviors/duties performed by the individual.  They must also 
engage in teamwork or coordination of these duties and appropriate attitudes that promote 
effective team performance.  Team behaviors include mutual performance monitoring, 
backup behavior, intrateam feedback, and a belief that success depends upon their 
interaction. Team leadership is also critical and modeling appropriate behavior by the 
leader is key to effectiveness. With regard to communication and coordination, when 
workload is low, explicit coordination is typical whereas implicit coordination is typical 
under high workload conditions.  Shared mental models are assumed to exist among 
established teams.  
 
The command-and-control team (Klimoski & Jones, 1995) is characterized by a 
highly coordinated, prescribed response to events. Functions of each job are highly 
specialized and interdependent, thus requiring extensive training.  If one person cannot 
accomplish his/her duties then the entire team suffers.  The team approach can involve a 
tradeoff between speed and accuracy—with teams potentially retarding the former but 
enhancing the latter.  
 
Teams must be considered within the environmental context in which they 
operate (Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995). Characteristics of the 
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situation and the organization affect task and work characteristics. These then determine 
the requisite team competencies for effective performance.   When there is a lack of 
knowledge and/or uncertainty about role responsibilities of other members, ineffective or 
degraded performance results. Knowledge and skills are not enough, the teams must have 
team relevant knowledge and skills; the members must be able to operate and employ 
their skills and knowledge within the team context. Team goals, objectives, mission, 
norms, resources, and the relationship to larger organization must be communicated and 
coordinated to improve team effectiveness.  A generic, heuristic model of team 
effectiveness is provided below.   
 
 













Source: Adapted from Hackman, 1987 in Klimoski  & Jones, 1995. 
 
Critical dimensions of teamwork include: communication, adaptability, 
coordination and cooperation, performance monitoring and feedback (giving and 
acceptance of suggestions or criticism), interpersonal relations, leadership/team 
management, shared situational awareness, and decision making.  The transfer of 
information and resources is crucial to success. Communication is vital and performance 
decreases as the intelligibility of communication degrades (Achille, Schulze, & Schmidt-
Nielsen, 1995).  Team structure and communication structure are related but not 
synonymous (Brannick, Salas, & Prince, 1997).   Team structure refers to the roles, 
information, and capabilities assigned to team members; whereas communication 
structure sets the parameters regarding who speaks to whom.  When the task structure is 
highly complex, highly interdependent, and decentralized, communication networks must 
be well developed. Group cohesion and communication and coordination training 
increase the performance of teams involved in complex, interdependent, and hierarchical 
tasks. Task difficulty moderates the communication processes.  
 
Aviation teams have received much research attention and in this arena, results 
show that faulty communication leads to accidents.  Communication frequency has been 
found to be correlated positively with performance in nonhierarchical teams but 
correlated negatively in hierarchical teams. Communication mediates the effects of 
workload and structure. Poor teams tend to overload information or communication 
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channels with a barrage of questions.  Communication and shared mental models are 
facilitated not only through familiarity but standardization (Leedom & Simon, 1995).   
A number of team dimensions have been examined in relation to performance 
including workload, time pressure, structure, individual proficiency, and overlapping 
skills (Salas, et al. 1995). Enumerating the combinations of results is beyond the scope of 
this synopsis but the point is that teams are not simply generic groups.  For teams to be 
effective, especially in a crisis, experience and skills in working together are critical 
(Tjosvold, 1995). Further, a team must be well structured and managed if they are to be 
efficient and effective. Faulty teamwork can lead to tragedy (Cannon-Bowers, et al. 
1995).  Accidents and performance deficiencies occur not because team members cannot 
perform their tasks but because they fail to coordinate their activities and efforts 
effectively. The need for expertise in various areas, stress and high workload characterize 
many military tasks.  High workload tends to degrade individual performance. The 
requirement for coordination in teams increases the individual workload, thus it is 
necessary to train and manage the coordination processes (Leedom & Simon, 1995; 
Urban, Bowers, Monday, & Morgan, 1995). Strong teams are characterized by 
formalization, coordination, cooperation, goal priority, interdependence, and trust (Salas, 
Bowers, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995).  
  
Team characteristics such as cohesiveness are important to coordination and 
success.  In fact, cohesiveness facilitates team decision making under time pressure 
(Zaccaro, Gualtieri, & Minionis, 1995).  Also, inter-positional uncertainty, or lack of a 
clear understanding of appropriate operational behaviors for each team member, results in 
lower quality coordination and poorer cohesion.  Communication, coordination, 
cohesion, and team processes in general are enhanced by interaction. In short, intra-team 
familiarity leads to better coordination and, hence, performance. For example, airline 
crews have been found to be better at coordinating decisions and actions if they have 
flown together recently (Leedom & Simon, 1995).    Individuals and the team evolve over 
time.  The length of time that a team is together has an impact on performance. 
(Brannick, Salas, & Prince, 1997).   
 
Attitudes are a very important but often ignored aspect of teams. Attitudes about 
self and team affect performance. Attitudes toward teamwork, collective orientation, 
cohesion, mutual trust, and shared vision are related to performance (Canon-Bowers, et 
al, 1995). Faulty attitudes toward teamwork are a problem. Teams possess competencies 
that transcend individual performance and provide a collective influence.  In addition to 
the functional structure, there is a need for a well-developed team concept or a collective 
orientation.  To reap the benefits of teamwork, there must be potency—the belief that the 
team will succeed.  Internal norms that are in synchrony and increased collective efficacy 
improve performance.   In short, it helps to have confidence in the team.  Potency is a 
result of actual ongoing interactions with environments. Shared perceptions of team 
efficacy influences team performance. Team level knowledge affects coordination 
strategies. Effective coordination and delegation occur when members view other 
members as competent.  The development of trust is vital. Before discussing trust further, 






Networks represent another type of organizational structure designed to tackle 
complex, multidimensional tasks. Such cooperative organizational alliances enhance 
competitiveness and effectiveness (Milward & Provan, 1998) by linking fragmented and 
uncoordinated service systems.  The objective of networking is to provide services 
efficiently and effectively (avoiding duplication of effort) while maintaining 
organizational autonomy (Provan & Milward, 2001).  The degree of network interaction 
varies on a continuum from intermittent coordination to more long lasting network 
structures (Mandell, 2003). As with teams, the structure of the integration affects 
performance and the degree of social learning that occurs as a result of the interactions 
and their results.  
 
Key to networking is cooperation and commitment of members.  Network 
management can contribute to program performance; Managers can influence results 
(Meier & O’Toole, 2003).  Interdependence requires dealing regularly with other 
organizations or agencies. Managers must link operations, tap resources, and encourage 
collaborative partnerships. Directing managerial time and effort toward networking can 
improve implementation performance and success.  It is necessary to devote time to 
dealing with such a complicated interdependent environment. Formal management of 
networks can pay dividends in the future.  
 
Network effectiveness often depends on the relative maturity and development of 
the network. Effectiveness requires trust and commitment, which are built on a history of 
interactions. At first, ties will be weak and loose as agencies test commitment and 
reliability. If the network is seen as temporary then resource sharing is limited in scope. 
The network must become a viable inter-organizational entity if it is to survive.  It must 
have legitimacy and external support. To be effective, the services must act as a network 
– incurring organizing and transaction costs. Formal public sector networks are led, 
coordinated, and governed by a central, local administrative entity or a network 
administrative organization (NAO) (Provan & Milward, 2001). Cooperative efforts are 
more complex than coordinated efforts; thus the former requires a more formal 
leadership/management system.   
 
Cooperation is the lynchpin of effective networking and cooperation is expected 
to produce outcomes that are more favorable to networked parties than when in 
competition.  In contrast to the private sector with its profit motive, cooperation should be 
suited to the public sector. Theoretically, the public sector should be less affected by the 
potential downsides of networking including reduced autonomy, shared resources, and 
increased dependence (Provan & Milward, 2001).  Networks can be perceived as a threat 
to survival and thus resource sharing, political turf battles, regulatory differences, and the 
like can encumber their success.  Successful networks require consideration of the 
relative power of members—not all are equal partners. Participants have to be willing to 
give up power and negotiate power struggles and conflicts.  It is necessary to dealing with 
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scarce resources as well as political and cultural realities and move beyond the 
government’s proclivity to operate via traditional, hierarchical relationships.   
Given the complexity and potential benefits from properly structured and 
maintained networks, evaluation and monitoring should be part of the management 
process.  Process and outcome evaluation can address whether the network is a more 
efficient and effective service delivery mechanism.  To be sure, gauging success is 
complicated.  And, before one measures the outcomes, it is important to measure the 
linkages or the actual degree of network connections (Provan & Milward, 2001). That is, 
it is necessary to determine whether and to what degree formal network processes are 
operating before assessing network outcomes. The content and quality of the interactions, 
decision-making skills, and complexity need to be measured.   In addition to assessing the 
strength of relationships between and among network members, it would be wise to 
evaluate its administrative structure or NAO, described above as the hallmark of a viable 
network. Evaluating outcomes requires recognition of networks’ multiple stakeholders. 
For example, for social service networks that are trying to improve access, utilization, 
responsiveness, and integration while maintaining or reducing costs, evaluation must 
consider the community, network, and organization levels.   
 
Networks provide a range of services—some critical and some peripheral. 
Evaluation can help the network to identify nonessential services and avoid duplication of 
effort.  Effectiveness tends to be seen by external groups as depending on what specific 
service providers either do or don’t do.  Agencies tend not to be rewarded for 
contribution to the network.  The lack of a constituency group for a network can be 
deleterious and thwart cooperative efforts because members may still be tying to ensure 
the survival of their own agency.  Acting in self-interest can preclude the using selected 
available resources more effectively.   
 
COOPERATION AND TRUST 
 
Effective teams or networks require not just involvement but cooperation to 
enhance success (Hillebrand & Biemans, 2003). Firms with well-developed internal and 
external interfaces perform better with the formal a prerequisite for the latter.  
Cooperation serves to minimize distinctions among group members, which can impede 
teamwork, information sharing, and coordination (Beersma, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, 
Moon, Conlon, & Ilgen, 2003). An often-overlooked moderator of team or network 
effectives is the reward structure.  There is an inherent tension between competitive and 
cooperative reward structures.  Thus, it may be necessary to change the organization to 
realize cooperation and achieve effective teams. Collaborative rewards promote trust, 
cohesiveness, and mutually supportive behavior.  In competitive structures there is a 
tendency to keep information proprietary.  Further, success is viewed as a zero-sum game 
thus factors are at work not only to win but also to impair the progress of others. 
Information and service industries (including Defense) tend to require coordination 
because tasks that one member faces are affected by the performance of others.  
Recalling the speed-accuracy tradeoff mentioned above, it may be necessary to 
implement hybrid cooperative and competitive reward structures reward structures.  
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Cooperative structures promote diffusion of knowledge throughout the team.  
There is exchange of information and discussion of ideas. For cooperation to work, the 
participants must be able to discuss opposing views openly. One must be a responsive 
and responsible team member and eschew good advice and insist on doing it “your” way.  
Studies of flight crew members show that when the team members believe that they had 
cooperative rather than competitive or independent goals, they were much more likely to 
coordinate their efforts effectively. Under cooperative reward structures and goals, 
members are much more prepared to discuss ideas openly and directly (Tjosvold, 1995). 
Although “real world” organizations seldom structure pure cooperative or competitive 





















Source: Tjosvold, 1995. 
 
In addition to competition and cooperation there is independence; group 
members’ goals are unrelated and attainment, efficiency, and effectiveness by one party 
neither helps nor hinders the other. “Interaction” is characterized by disinterest and 
indifference.  
 
Cooperation induces higher achievement and productivity, especially on more 
complex tasks. Cooperation promotes information sharing, adoption of another’s 
perspective, effective communication and influence, exchange of resources, assistance 
and support. Constructive controversy is the nature of the interaction.  It is under 
competitive and individualistic conditions that people are more likely to avoid conflict. 
Under competitive goals, managing conflict is difficult and infighting is common.  There 
tends to be a restriction of information and resource exchange; communication is 
distorted; and conflict is either escalated or avoided.  A depiction of constructive 




















 More division of labor  
 Role specialization 
 More economic use of personnel 
 More task productivity 
 Integrates self-interest to achieve mutual goals 
 Want others to act inefficiently; when others 
productive they are less likely successful 
 Prove they are most capable  
 Own ideas superior 
 Frustrated when others develop useful ideas 























Organizational linkages, strategic alliances, partnerships, and joint ventures 
characterize modern organizations.  Such cooperative arrangements are more responsive 
to rapid change; and they increase effectiveness of communication and problem solving. 
To manage teams and/or networks, interpersonal dynamics are important and trust is 
crucial.   Trust is a state involving confident positive expectations about another’s 
motives with respect to oneself in situations entailing risk. High levels of trust reduce 
transaction costs and uncertainty about the future (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Trust is 
important for cooperation, coordination, and performance.  Once built, it is expected; and 
broken trust has greater negative motivational consequences than confirmation of trust.  
Trust involves not just predictability but confidence in the face of risk. Trust is invoked 
when there is an ambiguous course of action in the future, the outcome depends on the 
behavior of others, and the strength of the harmful event is greater than the beneficial 
event.   
 
Three elements contribute to level of trust:1) chronic disposition toward trust; 2) 
situational parameters; and 3) history of the relationship. Trust is a dynamic phenomenon 
involving reciprocal self-disclosure and conflict resolution. The processes of evaluation 
and information exchange are at work.  Lewicki and Bunker (1996) describe three types 
of trust is business contexts: 
 
1. Deterrence/calculus-based trust – behavioral consistency.  Do what you 
say you will do. 
2. Knowledge-based trust – behavioral predictability; other’s likely choice 
of behaviors. 
3. Identification-based trust – empathy with other party’s desires and 













Calculus based trust involves an ongoing, market-oriented, economic calculation 
whose value is derived by determining the outcomes resulting from creating and 
sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it. Calculus 
rather than deterrence conveys the importance of the rewards of maintaining the 
cooperation. Calculus based trust is partial and fragile and is driven by the desire to 
maintain a professional reputation.  
 
As its label implies, knowledge-based trust relies on information. The parties have 
a history of interaction and thus develop a generalized expectancy about each other.  The 
better one knows the other the more accurate the prediction. Predictability enhances trust 
and accuracy requires repeated interactions in multidimensional relationships. Regular 
communication is important.  
 
Identification-based trust seems the “best model” for the Joint Service and 
Interagency situation.  Such trust relies on salient group identification.  That is, the 
parties identify with the goals of the linked organizations. Such identification enhances 
the frequency of cooperation. Activities that strengthen identification-based trust include: 
collective identity, co-location, creating joint products or goals, and committing to same 
objectives. A synchronous chemistry characterizes the relationships.  
 
 Regardless of the type of trust, it must be developed and maintained to best 
cooperative advantage.  Trust evolves and changes and it can decline.  The team or 
network perspective suggests that inter-organizational cooperation is more than a 
contractual and legal arrangement.  Cooperation requires management attention to 
include formulation of rules, prevention of instability and disorder, and promotion or 
defense of mutual interests. Firms are not independent, acting on their own in the market. 
They have to interact with other firms and organizations such as government, 
associations, regulatory commissions and the like.  Lasting and stable relations promote 
common knowledge and knowledge sharing (in lieu of reinventing the proverbial wheel) 
is important to organizational success. 
 
Suggestions for Joint Task Force Management 
 
The literature regarding teams and networks offers valuable suggestions for the 
organization of Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Given the complex tasks assigned to JTFs, 
teams or networks are a logical organizational strategy. And, just as the tasks or missions 
are complex, developing and maintaining the team are also complex. Teams can solve 
complex, difficult problems effectively. Groups must be well structured and managed if 
they are to solve problems effectively and efficiently.  
 
Effective teams require appropriate knowledge, skills, and attitudes among its 
constituents. They not only call for appropriate staffing and material resources, but 
organizational support, mission clarity, communication, commitment, and leadership.  
Teams must be effectively managed and see themselves as teams. Experience and skills 
in working together are critical. Being familiar with one another can aid members in their 
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performance.  Service over joint familiarity may also present a potential pitfall.  If the 
JTF commander is expected to take on the leading role for his Service as well, this can be 
problematic and dilute leadership effectiveness for the JTF.  An unwarranted over 
reliance on one Service may work against the more efficient and effective Joint, 
capabilities-based approach. Standing JTF Headquarters (perhaps aligned by COCOM 
but coordinated across COCOMs) could alleviate the role overload of the JTF 
commander and build and track the detailed Joint knowledge of capabilities and 
availability for the JTFs.   
 
Given the increasing importance of strategic, global “reach,” the Services cannot 
go it alone; rather, “interdependence” is the norm. Teams and strategic alliances put one 
at an advantage. The bedrock of teams is cooperation and trust.  Trust is vital to success. 
If there is a crisis of confidence, the partnership will fall apart. In addition to drill and 
practice there is also a need to identify a viable cooperative structure. Given the 
importance of strong relationships to handling crisis one cannot just hope that the team 
will come together in a crisis.  Certainly, military units strive for and typically achieve 
cohesion but it is important to achieve this within new multi-unit modules and in Joint 
situations.  It is important that existing within-unit and single Service cohesion not be 
counterproductive to the JTF environment.   Internal cooperation is a prerequisite for but 
not a guarantee of external cooperation.  With the increasing frequency of JTF operations 
and the short suspense period for standing them up, trust might well be enhanced if JTF 
HQ informed the deployment planning process. Such HQ leaders and staff would be 
motivated to become familiar with and track Joint capabilities and resources, which could 
well catapult Joint operations, interdependencies, and interoperability.  
 
Although the Joint-Service concept is not new, present organizational structures 
and processes do not appear to promote actually operating jointly. There seem to be 
deficiencies in terms of shared goals and thinking of the “joint” groups as teams.  Further, 
there is much redundancy in terms of support, which works against interdependence. 
Although Joint was mandated many years ago, with each operation much of the operation 
appears still to be new and informal with the Services operating independently.  Without 
a formal and perhaps co-located management structure, there may be prohibitive start up 
costs each time a JTF is stood up.  JTFs may be short lived but standing JTF HQs would 
enhance the team processes described above.  
 
The reward structure is among the management issues to consider.  Collective 
rewards are required for cooperation.  Individual rewards promote competition. 
Individual responsibility can be retained with collective rewards through making tasks 
visible and making individuals accountable. Of course the rewards at the organizational 
level may need restructuring as well.  Each service vies for control of financial, material 
and human resources and activities. Cooperation and true Joint operations may result in a 
restructuring and reconfiguration of the Services and perhaps relinquishing some 
individual Service control.  Keeping the “far” common goal in mind may be difficult in 
the face of near rewards but it is important for the efficient and effective operation of 
networks. As described in the main body of the report, Joint functional support networks 
and funding is among the “lessons learned.” 
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Finally, it is important to evaluate the network—in terms of process and 
outcomes.  In addition to the information provided by “After Action Reports,” it would 
be wise to measure the links and network structures in joint operations.  Defining the 
“customer” for JTFs is difficult but subsequent to identifying measures of effectiveness, 
JTF teams should be evaluated at the mission, JTF and individual service levels.  Also, it 
is a good idea to measure effectiveness and costs over time as the team and management 
structure evolve and achieve a high level of coordination and cooperation. If the military 
has yet to embrace Joint Operations totally, than inter-agency cooperation is a problem 
and multi-nation coalitions are even more problematic.   
 
The creation of standing JTF Headquarter “teams” could be expected to enhance 
JTF team performance.  This level and type of interaction is expected to improve 
communication, coordination, and cohesion and promote legitimacy and potency. The 
JTF HQs are expected to enhance true “Jointness” and capture the lessons from 
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(Rank, Last Name).  Thank you for taking the time to participate in this 
interview.  As I previously mentioned to you, this is part of an on-going 
study looking at Joint Task Force Operations.  In the first part of our study, 
we reviewed the 25 most recent JTF operations to synthesize major issues 
associated with the JTF process. 
 
Our review of operations revealed that since the early 1990s, the US Military 
has been called to respond to an unprecedented number of crises throughout 
the world.  While the military has managed to accomplish each of these 
missions, the Services have had to incur various costs along the way.  As the 
numbers of missions have increased, both spending and manpower have 
continually decreased. 
 
Today we would like to talk about your experiences in Joint Task Force 
Operations and further explore some of the issues we discovered through our 
initial study.  We would like to get your perspective on the challenges and 
opportunities associated with the formation, activation and operation of a 




We are interviewing individuals with first hand knowledge and experience 
with JTF operations.  We are interviewing members of all branches of the 
military to learn about their experiences.  We are also interested in speaking 
to staff personnel affiliated with your particular operation.  If you have any 
suggestions or recommendations we ought to consider please feel free to let 
us know.  We would appreciate any suggestions that can inform our efforts. 
 
At the completion of our interviews, a report will be compiled that 
summarizes the major points addressed in the interviews.  The report will 
not include any information about the individuals with whom we speak—
responses will remain anonymous.  The report will communicate the 
substance of the views and concerns individuals have shared during the 
interviews. 
 






















Before we begin, let me share a few ground rules we will be following: 
 
 We are very interested in your individual opinions and experiences.  
Keep in mind that we’re interested in all of your comments, positive 
and negative.  Feel free to share anything you deem relevant to our 
discussion. 
 
 You may be assured of complete confidentiality.  We will maintain 
your confidentiality.  We will not use any names or other identifying 
information in the study.  We may report comments verbatim but only 
without any names or other identifying information. 
 
 We would like to tape record the session.  Your opinions are 
important to us and we don’t want to miss any of your 
comments/suggestions.  Tape recording your opinions will allow us to 
prepare an accurate report.  The tape recorded interviews will be 
transcribed by members of the research team.  The names of 
participants will not be included in the transcribed reports.  Only 
members of the research team will have access to these records.  The 
tapes will be erased once the research is completed.  Unless there are 
any objections, we will be tape recording today’s session [PAUSE 
AND WAIT FOR A RESPONSE]. 
 
 Please speak loud and clear.  We want to make sure we record all of 
your comments/suggestions.  Please be sure to speak loud and clear. 
 
 Our interview should take approximately no more than an hour-
and-a-half.  If we need to pause at anytime during the process feel 


























I’d like to begin our interview by asking a couple of background questions 
about your experience. 
 
1.  WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF YOUR EXPERIENCE IN JOINT 
TASK FOR CE OPERATIONS? 
 
Probes: 
 What operation(s) were you involved with? (OP Name/JTF) 
 What type of operation(s) was it (Combat, PKO, HAST, NEO)? 
 What was your role in the operation?  How long did you serve in role? 
 What were the major challenges confronted during the operation? 
 
2.  AS YOU REFLECT BACK ON YOUR EXPERIENCES, I WOULD 
LIKE FOR YOU TO THINK ABOUT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT 
JTF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE YOU HAVE HAD THUS FAR. 
 
Probes: 
 What operation/JTF was it? Why does it stand out in your mind? 
o Were there particular circumstances associated with this 
experience? 
 Explore: Any unique aspects including people, place, 
mission 
o Were there particular challenges associated with this 
experience? 
 Explore: Any unique challenges not seen in previous 
JTFs 
 Can you think of some of the successes associated with this 
operation? 
o Were there any characteristics that contributed to its successes? 
 Explore: Any factors contributing to the OP success 
 Can you think of some of the failures associated with this operation? 
o Were there any characteristics that contributed to its failures? 
 Explore: Any factors contributing to the failures 
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3.  AS YOU REFLECT BACK ON THIS EXPERIENCE, WHAT 
SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD YOU OFFER TO 
ENHANCE THE FUTURE SUCCESS OF FUTURE JTFs? 
 
Probes: 
 Would you have any recommendations for JTF HQ (C2)? 
 Would you have any recommendations for JTF C4ISR? 
 Would you have any recommendations for Joint Logistics? 









I would like to discuss issues concerning the Command & Control (C2) of 
the JTF and more specifically the JTF HQ. 
 
4.  PLEASE DESCRIBE THE STRUCTURE OF THE JTF HQ 
ELEMENT?  
 How was it formed? [Service centric vs. “Joint” organization] 
o Explore: Decision making process underlying formation process 
 Individuals influencing the process 
 Key considerations of the situation 
 
Probes: 
 What were some of the advantages of this structure? 
o Explore: Within-Service/Between-Service Advantages 
 
 What were some of the disadvantages of this structure? 
o Explore: Between-Service/Within-Service Disadvantages 
 
 Did the JTF HQ have the required people with the necessary 
knowledge, skills and abilities to complete the mission? 
o Explore: When were key JTF HQ billets filled? 
 How long did it take for the JMD to be 
approved/vetted/filled? 
 Were Services responsive to personnel requests? 
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5.  WERE THERE ANY CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
PERSONNEL SELECTION, PLACEMENT AND AUGMENTATION 
PROCESS FOR THE JTF HQ? 
 
Probes: 
 How were personnel augmented into the JTF HQ? 
o Explore: Source Fill Type—IA/Unit Fill/TDY 
 Did the JTF HQ have adequate manpower levels? 
o What was the fill rate for the JTF HQ? 
o How long did it take to get adequate levels? 
 Were personnel adequately trained for their positions? 
o Were personnel familiar/knowledgeable of JTTPs? 
 Explore: Levels of “joint” experience/expertise 
o Were personnel familiar/knowledgeable of interagency 
processes? 
 Explore: Depth of InterAgency experience 
o Were personnel familiar/knowledgeable of Coalitional 
processes? 
 Explore: Depth of Coalition experience 
 How can we ensure that personnel are trained to fill these roles in the 
future? 
o Explore: JMD Modification suggestions 
o Explore: Schooling/Training Requirements 
o Explore: Training—at what level? Who 
funds/organizes/evaluates? 
 
6.  WERE THERE ANY CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 




 Were there any challenges for filling/replacing particular positions? 
o Explore: If training was the issue vs. personnel shortage 
 What about with respect to rotating/replacing personnel? 
o Explore: Timing of the process/turnover process 
o Explore: If timing resulted in losses of institutional memory 
 How were challenges resolved—were SOPs developed? 
 How were new personnel integrated into the JTF HQ? 








Since we are talking about personnel issues, let me ask you discuss the Joint 
Reception, Staging, Onward Integration process for JTF personnel in general 
and for JTF HQ personnel in particular. 
 
7.  DESCRIBE THE JRSOI PROCESS FOR THE JTF 
 
Probes: 
 How did individuals/units flow into and out of the JTF? 
o Explore: Ask them to describe the transition process 
o Explore: Ask about stopping points—where would units be 
go/no-go 
 ID factors that would keep an individual/unit from 
moving forward 
 
8.  WHAT ISSUES CHALLENGED THE JRSOI PROCESS 
 
Probes: 
 Were there any training concerns that kept recurring? 
o Explore: What were the training limitations for arriving units? 
o Explore: Were training issues able to be addressed at JRSOI? 
 If Yes, how? Who organized it? Funded it? Evaluated it? 
 If No, why? What were the reasons why the issue was 
not resolved at the JRSOI?  What were the limitations? 
o Explore: Were there units that did not move forward at all? 
 Were there any equipment concerns that kept recurring? 
o Explore: What equipment shortfalls was commonplace? 
 C2 Related Equipment 
 J-C4ISR Equipment 




9.  WHAT CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES 
 
Probes: 
 Are there any doctrinal changes that ought to be considered? 
 Are there any changes that may impact the JMD process? Do we need 







Next, I would like to explore communications within the JTF.  I am 
particularly interested in learning about how the communications process 
was organized within the JTF HQ. I would also like to get a sense of the 
communications configuration—equipment used. 
 
10.  CAN YOU PROVIDE A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE JTF? 
 
Probes: 
 What type of systems was used for C4ISR? 
o Explore: Type of hardware used by JTF 
o Explore: Type of software used by JTF 
o Explore: Type of Netware used by JTF 
 
11.  WHAT WERE SOME OF THE CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS PROCESS FOR THE JTF? 
 
Probes: 
 Did communication processes function to meet the needs of the JTF 
HQ? 
o Explore: If YES 
 What factors facilitate success? 
 Were communications capabilities already available for 
use? 
o Explore: If NO 
 What factors contributed to the failure? 
 How were these factors resolved? 
 How did these issues impact JTF? 
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 Did communication process function to meet the needs of supporting 
units/organizations? 
o Explore: If YES 
 What factors facilitate success? 
 Were communications capabilities already available for 
use? 
o Explore: If NO 
 What factors contributed to the failure? 
 Hardware/Software/Netware issues 
 How were these factors resolved? 
 How did these issues impact JTF? 
 
 Did communications process function to meet the needs of the 
Interagency organizations? 
o Explore: Communication challenges with the Interagency 
 Hardware/Software/Netware Issues 
 Access/Classification/Sanitation Issues 
 Impact on JTF operations? 
 How were these issues resolved? 
 Any policy/doctrinal recommendations? 
 
 Did communications process function to meet the needs of the 
Coalition partners? 
o Explore: Communication challenges with Coalition partners 
 Hardware/Software/Netware Issues 
 Access/Classification/Sanitation Issues 
 Impact on JTF operations? 
 How were these issues resolved? 
 Any policy/doctrinal recommendations? 
 
12.  WHAT SUGGESTIONS WOULD YOU OFFER TO IMPROVE 




 Any policy guidance with regard to OTE? 
o Explore: Standard requirements for JTF COM packages 
 JTF HQ, Supporting Organizations/Units Requirements 








Next, I would like to explore the logistics aspects of the JTF process.   
 
13.  DESCRIBE THE LOGISTICS PROCESS FOR THE JTF 
 
Probes: 
 What was the underlying logistics model? 
o Service Centric vs. Joint  
 How were the logistics requirements filled? 
 Who was responsible for identifying/tracking/filling requirements? 
o Single Service/Lead Service/Joint 
 
 
14.  WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE LOGISTIC PROCESS 
 
Probes: 
 Did the process work well? 
 What were some of the underlying challenges? 
 What changes were required to make the process work? 
 What impact did these changes have on JTF operations?  
o Explore: Impact on JTF HQ operations 
o Explore: Impact on Supporting Organizations 
 
 
15.  ARE THERE ANY CHANGES YOU WOULD RECOMMEND 
FOR DOCTRINE OR TRAINING? 
 
Probes: 
 Which of the changes would suggest institutionalizing into 
doctrine/training? 
 What potential gains may these changes have on future JTF 
operations?  
o Explore: Impact on JTF HQ operations 




INTERAGENCY & COALITION INTEGRATION 
 
 
Now let me ask you to discuss JTF interaction with the Interagency and 
Coalition partners. 
 
16.  DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THE INTERACTIONS WITH 
THE INTERAGENCY AND COALITION PARTNERS 
 
Probes: 
 What was the role of the interagency/coalition in the JTF or JTF HQ? 
o Explore: Any IA/COAL personnel in the JTF-HQ? 
 Were there any existing relationships that helped to establish JTF-
IA/COA interactions? 
 
17.  WHAT WERE SOME OF THE CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED 




 Were there any unique issues to consider? 
o Explore: C4ISR issues 
o Explore: Intel sharing issues 
 How were these issues resolved? 
o Explore: JTF SOPs developed for working with IA/COA 
 How would you assess the workarounds developed during the 
process? 
o Explore: Can these be translated into doctrine? 
 
18.  WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD YOU SUGGEST FOR 
WORKING WITH IA/COAL PARTNERS IN FUTURE JTFs 
 
Probes: 
 Are there any policies that need to be developed for working with 
IA/COA 
o Explore: C4ISR issues 







Let me summarize some of the major points that I heard during our 
discussion.  [SUMMARIZE THE MAJOR POINTS OF THE 
DISCUSSION].  Are there any other points that I missed?  Are there any 
additional points? 
 
This concludes our interview.  Once again let me thank you for taking the 
time to share your opinions and experiences.  Your opinions are invaluable 
for our efforts to learn about the myriad of factors that affect the JTF 
process.  Thank you. 
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